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THE MAKING OF JORDANIAN AMERICAN
NATIONAL IDENTITY IN MICIDGAN
David Chaudoir, M.A
Western Michigan University, 2003
This thesis explores the making of Jordanian American national identity in
Michigan.

Moreover, it examines the notion of national identity in transnational

spaces in relation to what Brian Schiff has metaphorically referred to as "cultural
currents," comprised of values, symbols, political philosophies, habits, etc. of social
actors. How do various cultural currents influence the way in which people talk and
think about themselves in national terms? Why is national identity a meaningful
concept, and how is it influenced by culture and ethnicity? To what degree do entities
such as the state hold influence over national identity, especially in the case of Jordan
which was created by colonial powers as a Levantine buffer state in the mid-twentieth
century? What role does history play in the construction of national identity on the
transnational level? This paper argues that Jordanian American identity in Michigan is
being made within conflicting American currents, some of which are inherently anti
Arab. National identity-making processes are examined in the context of southeast
Michigan's concentrated Arab community, and in light of inconstant definitions of
"Jordanian" and "Palestinian" in Jordan itself
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
My initial encounters with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Jordanians and
indeed anthropology were both fortuitous and concurrent. I was an undergraduate
student majoring in English looking to fill credits for a geography minor that
became--during my tenure as an undergraduate student-defunct. I was offered an
opportunity to study with an archae·ology team in Jordan one summer and earn enough
credits in anthropology to fulfill the minor's requirements. At the time, I knew nothing
about Jordan but enough about archaeology to know that digging in the dirt was not
for me. 0ystein LaBianca, director of the archaeology project and himself an erudite
ethnoarchaeologist, offered to set me up with an ideal ethnography project in a
Jordanian village that would ultimately benefit both my own research and that of the
archaeological expedition. I was allowed to live with the archaeologists (a minor
thrill, I confess), but had the freedom to conduct participant observation in the village
(Dhamraq) in what became a baptism-by-fire ethnographic field school of one (a
surprisingly awesome experience). It was from these first ethnographic field
experiences that I became immersed and profoundly interested in Jordanian,
Palestinian and, moreover, Arab lifeways.
When I returned to Michigan, I was much more attuned to any media reports
about Jordan, the Middle East and Arabs. Before my first experience in Jordan, I

scarcely realized that I was living just across the state from the largest concentration of
people of Arab descent in North America (in the Greater Detroit region, i.e.
Dearborn). It took a chance trip to the Middle East to raise my awareness about
Arabs and Arab Americans. Up to then, I had naively relied on stereotypes and the
Western media's interpretation of Arabs and the Middle East to form my own
conclusions about sensitive regional issues involving Arabs such as the Israeli
Palestinian crisis, oil economies, the Persian Gulf war, and so forth. Due in no small
part to the negative reactions I encountered when talking about my experiences with
friends and family, I suddenly realized that most Americans were similar to me in their
understandings of Arabs and Arab Americans.
"Why would you want to study Arabs?" "Muslims hate Christians, right?"
"Aren't you afraid for your safety?" "Don't they chop off your hand if you steal
something?" "Arabs are strange, aren't they?" were all common questions I faced
when people discovered my newfound interest in cultures of the Middle East. It is to
these widespread misconceptions that I answer, in part, with this work. I will examine
national identity in the context of both Jordan and southeast Michigan. Theoretically,
I will discuss how we may begin to look at national identity in transnational spaces.
Why Jordanians? Why Arab Americans? Why National Identity?
Jordanians in general are arguably the least understood Arabs in the Middle
East and the wider world. Only two American cultural anthropologists of significance,
Richard Antoun and Andrew Shryock, have published and continue to publish their
work on and about Jordanian peoples. Linda Layne has published a short but erudite
2

study of national and tribal identities in Jordan (1994), though she no longer works on
Jordanian or identity issues. Thus, there is a wide gap in the anthropological literature
about Jordanians and Jordanian society in general. In the transnational context,
virtually nothing has been published regarding statistical, political, economic or
cultural nuances in Jordanian American communities. Antoun (1999) and Shyrock
have only recently begun to publish their work in that regard, and it has yet to reach
genuine fruition.
Given the world's attention on the United States' policy and interventions in
the Arab Middle East, and the foundational and growing misconceptions about Arabs
among large sectors of American society, there is a need for better understandings of
often misrepresented and misunderstood Arab American communities. I believe that
by thinking about our own neighbors in a more productive and enlightened way (that
is, by not lending credence to deeply embedded stereotypes and ethnic archetypes
propagated by lazy, racist, biased Western media), we may better understand the
places, people and cultures that are the Arabs and the Middle East.
While there has been a multitude of studies about Arab Americans, most of
these studies have focused on religion (Elkholy 1966), assimilation and cultural
adaptation (Abraham and Abraham 1981; Naff 1985; Suleiman 1999), historical
processions and early experiences (Mehdi 1978; Naff 1985; Hooglund 1987), and
immigrant settlement (Aswad 1974; Abraham and Abraham 1983). One edited
volume has been concerned with the development of Arab American identity
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(McCarus 1994), though it focuses primarily on the aforementioned topics and does
not tackle issues of national identity.
Only one significant if somewhat uneven edited volume, Arab Detroit: From

Margin to Mainstream, has been published about the Arab American communities in
southeast Michigan (Abraham and Shyrock 2000). This is the first work to address
issues consequential to transnational processes among Arab communities outside of
the Middle East, though the essays do not identify the processes as such and few are
argued critically. The significance of this work lies in its adherence to a theme--the
processes involved as Arab Americans in the Detroit area are moving from the margins
of American culture into mainstream America-and how that theme manifests itself in
everyday life in southeast Michigan. I build upon arguments raised by the books
editors, Nabeel Abraham and Andrew Shryock.
Anthropologists have traditionally talked about national identity in terms of
nationalism and the state, and not in terms of local culture. Nationalism in Jordan has
been all but bypassed in anthropological studies, and even less has been written about
national identity in Jordan (see Layne 1994; Shryock 1997 for exceptions). Most of
the scholarship on national identity in and of Jordan has been authored by political
scientists (Massad 2001; Lynch 1999), as seems to be the case with most studies on
national identity in the Arab Middle East in general (see Khalidi 1997; Lesch 1998).
Anthropologists are left, then, with very little in the way of literature about national
identity in and of Arab countries by other anthropologists, and with nothing that
examines Jordanian American national identity.
4

In light of the importance of transnational studies in anthropology and across
the disciplines (see Glick Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton 1992), research on
national identities in expatriate and immigrant communities around the world serves to
demonstrate how people on the move continue to think of themselves in terms of their
national origin and the place(s) to which they migrate and live. Such studies need not
focus exclusively on immigrants themselves; indeed, my study refers in general to how
transnational processes might affect first, second and even third generations of Arabs
in Michigan.
In writing about the making ·of Jordanian American national identity, I have
specifically sought not to essentialize a group of people or to demean the viability of
distinctness and self-identity claimed by Jordanian Americans. My intention has not
been to write about people from a distance in order to encapsulate them so as to make
assumptions and judgments about their character or culture. I recognize the history of
anthropology, such as the national character studies of the mid-twentieth century, that
might lead one to such a conclusion about the present work, and it is in recognizing
the discipline's own history that I offer this caveat. The ethnographic distance one
may feel in reading this is a result of methodological constraints as described below,
and not derivative of adverse intentions on my part.
Methodological Constrictions: Arabs at the Margins in America
What I call the "new September 11 narrative" (see chapter three)-involving
deeply embedded anti-Arab racism and a fervent American jingoism-to some degree
ordained the way in which research for this project was conducted. I did not enjoy the
5

kind of access one would hope for in a study of this nature. My Arab American
contacts in southeastern Michigan advised me that heightened tensions surrounding
America's "war on terrorism" and the 2003 war in Iraq precluded many otherwise
willing Arab American participants from speaking with me. The nature of the
fieldwork I conducted was very much touch-and-go according to the happenings on
any given day with respect to the overall American "war on terrorism."
It is important to note that while my access was limited, I was able to conduct
several in-depth interviews with both prominent and other Jordanian Americans in
Michigan. In chapter four, for instance, I describe my experiences on an Arabic call-in
radio talk show and in an interview with the show's host, which are illustrative of the
tangible, negative effects that the new September 11 narrative has had in Michigan.
Due in part to the reaction (or lack thereof) to this show, I became aware fairly early
in my research that participant-observation was not going to be an adequate
methodology. I needed to employ an ethnographic methodology that allowed me to
still emphasize the importance of social actors and circumstances as they are played
out "on the ground" while considering the inherent difficulties of conducting field
research during times of large-scale crises for Arab Americans, and the world in
general.
Concerning my overall methodology, then, I have employed a type of historical
ethnography
. that involves encounters with only a few individuals, and thus provides
few ethnographic details about happenings in specific places as is consistent with
classic anthropological monographs. Instead, I have offered a critical analysis of the
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history involved and how it is engaged in the contexts in which Jordanian American
national identity is made. I have interspersed this analysis with some ethnographic
accounts from Jordan and the United States.
I argue that such a methodology allows for a broader consideration of what it
means to be of Arab descent in the United States-specifically in southeast
Michigan-today. That is, by examining the specific narratives, institutions and
events, for example, in which Jordanian American identity is created, we may begin to
think about the people involved in these processes as dynamic, unique and creative. I
believe it is more useful to offer a study of this kind at this time, than-say-a series
of purely ethnographic anecdotes about immigration experiences or life histories of a
few individuals, because it proposes a beginning framework for thinking about other
national identities in transnational contexts, which I believe has heretofore been
lacking in the discipline.
Other anthropologists have suggested that historical ethnography of this kind is
a practical means to address wide-ranging effects of the activities of many people in
many places "not readily discernible from any single location in either time or space"
(Des Chene 1997). Mary Des Chene (1997: 80) is also careful to point out that
criticism of this methodology is often leveled at its neglect of variations "knowable
only through close study of particular cases, and thus its general claims are not well
grounded." However, as I will argue, the variations of how, why and when social
actors engage historical narratives in the making of national identity is inherent in the
nuances of "culture" which lend themselves to solid critique. It is through these
7

critiques that one comes to better understand individualized social and indeed national
groups such as Jordanian Americans.
Indeed, the whole notion of what compromises "the field" in anthropology has
recently undergone a significant critique within the discipline (see Gupta and Ferguson
1997a, 1997b). Thus, while I primarily focus upon the social context of Michigan as
the place in which Jordanian Americans are engaged in national identity-making, I
have drawn upon a variety of historical, ethnographic and popular sources in
considering the "fieldwork" conducted for this project. My intention has not been to
provide a comprehensive interpretation or ethnographic documentation of how
Jordanian American national identity is made and maintained, but rather to provide
some historical insight into Jordanian national identity in general and the context in
which "Jordanian American" as a national identity is being formed and realized in
Michigan today.
Future ethnographic work in this context might benefit from a methodology
Brian Schiff (2003) employed in interviewing Arab students at Hebrew University,
which involved extensive interviews of opportunity in a ethnopolitically-charged
environment (Jerusalem) with a relatively small sample size (sixteen people). Schiff
argues that (2003: 285):
"The strength of this [methodology] lies in the ability to uncover patterns
evident in particular lives and to describe a common pattern across numerous
interviews .... Such an approach allows us to move beyond the limits of identity
labels in survey data in order to consider the processes inherent in making
8

identity. The result is a complex interpretation of lives rather than the
percentage of people who give themselves one-, two-, or three-word labels."
This complex interpretation of lives, as Schiff puts it, is where the future of identity
studies lies. Labels themselves are unimportant and impotent; it is in the discovery of
what comprises those labels and how they are imbued with meaning by an individual
and others, that is important. Following this route, the anthropologist is better
equipped to determine changes in historical narratives in transnational environments,
and how such changes might ultimately affect social processes, including the making of
national identity.
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CHAPTER II
NATIONAL IDENTITY IN TRANSNATIONAL SPACES
National identity, as Akhil Gupta put it, appears to be a "'natural "' marker of
cultural and social di:fference-"firmly spatialized and seemingly immutable" (1997:
180). National identity, he argues, becomes particularly problematic in the face of
transnational processes. In a transnational world, who is associated with a particular
nationality at any given time, and what are the processes that render and augment this
association in a transnational context? When are individual relationships with national
identity fomented? Who does the associating and for what purposes?
The notion of an "immutable link between cultures, people or identities and
specific places" is arguably hard for anthropologists to overcome, since matching
seemingly unambiguous national borders with identities has been a customary
anthropological endeavor (Lavie and Swedenburg 1996: 1). In reality, though,
identities are ambiguous; they're overlapping, contradictory, and difficult to
conceptualize and articulate. Political boundaries cannot be assumed to correlate
naturally with those that live inside those borders. And yet, while scholars may agree
that national identity is malleable, it must also, to some degree, be fixed since national
identity has meaningful implications in people's lives.
Most scholars seem to agree, quite correctly, that identity in general is a
multivocal concept 0Nertsch 1991). That is, identity is comprised of various voices
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that are dissimilar from one another but yet concurrently work together to form how
and why people talk about themselves, and how others talk about them. Initially, this
raises an uncertainty as to how the various voices of a given identity work together.
Perhaps they are braided together in the same manner Arjun Appadurai proposes for
his "-scapes," with ethnoscapes and ideoscapes and so on all intermetshing to form,
finally, a cultural system (Appadurai 1991). Here I am not offering a direct
comparison of the "-scapes" with aspects of identity, but rather am proposing a model
of actual mechanics through which transnational processes may be understood in the
course of identity making and maintenance (see Blanc-Szanton, Basch and Glick
Schiller 1995).
Identity is ascribed and subscribed to, created and maintained, based on
individual understandings of history and the self These understandings are deciphered
through various cultural institutions such as marriage, economics, religion, law and so
forth-institutions that locate the self in a finite-but broader than individual
context. Therefore, if identity can be thought of as being "made"-that is, involving
active social agency whether by the individual or through a hierarchy such as the state,
in its making-then we may begin thinking about identity itself as a cultural
construction, involving fl.exile but systematic processes. National identity on the
transnational level, then, necessarily involves more cultural systems in its making than
national identity in one particular place, as I argue later.
Thinking of national identities as multivocal creations raises a few
uncertainties: Are the voices that comprise identities variable or fixed? Should they be
11

seen as markers of a cohesive unity or as makers of difference? According to Stuart
Hall, identities are "more the product of the marking of difference and exclusion, than
they are the sign of an identical, naturally-constituted unity" because they are fomented
in specific historical and institutional circumstances and through particular discursive
formations and practices (1996: 4). These historical and 1nstitutional circumstances
are the cultural influences that fix identities in narratives that are recognized and
regularly modeled by social actors in any context. As I will argue in chapter three, for
example, the American narrative in which Jordanian American identity is made-in
light of recent events-has greatly influenced the national identity-making process for
Jordanian Americans in Michigan.
The State and the Nation
"Culture" and "nation" are two dominant and important voices (or concepts)
for those concerned with national identity theory, though the relationship between
these concepts has not been adequately addressed, especially in light of transnational
processes. National labels such as "Jordan" or "Mauritius," for example, are used by
actors in a transnational context as signifiers of culture, of which national sentiment
may or may not be a part, and if such sentiment is present it is not necessarily related
to the national label invoked. It is one mode of survival in the world system, in terms
of both inter-state relations (think France and French nationalism in the European
Union), and of individuals competing for resources in a transnational context.
Self-declarations in the name of a state (such as "I am a Jordanian") also do
not reflect the ethnic and cultural tensions that exist within that state, nor do they
12

attest to the implications of subscribing to an all-encompassing identity. Western
conceptions of national identity often conflate citizenship and national sentiment. In
Jordan, citizenship is often the only means of mobility for the majority population of
Palestinians (see chapter five for a discussion of this). As we shall see, the
consequences ofjust who is "Jordanian" and who is "Palestinian" are significant in
Jordan and may not be evident on the transnational level. Similarly, non-immigrant
Arab Americans (those that are second and third generations born in the United
States) who self-identify as Jordanian Americans may only do so because of cultural
and ethnic sentiments toward a larger kinship network whose members live in many
different countries. Thus, the "Jordanian" voice in their self-identity is evocative of a
cultural sentiment, while their national sentiment may be "American," yet together they
form a composite national identity.
In his fieldwork on Mauritius, Thomas Eriksen describes this as an "us" and
"we" predicament: "Mauritians are ... Mauritian in relation to what others see ["us
hood"]. Seen from the perspective of the collectivity of we (that is, the system view
from within), Mauritians tend to experience ... daily multiethnicity as a perpetual cause
of anxiety and frustration" (1994: 566). Indeed, daily multiculturalism is a perpetual
cause of frustration and anxiety in Jordan, as I will discuss later. The issue at hand is
how these frustrations and anxieties manifest themselves in transnational communities.
Are Jordanian Americans and Palestinian Americans in a similar competition for
recognition and resources in Michigan as they are in the Levant? Or is "Arab
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American" the primary community in which people of Arab descent form their national
identities in Michigan? If the latter was true, would it render state identities irrelevant?
Gupta calls attention to the "structures of feelings that bind people together'' in
systems that supercede nations and/or crosscut national boundaries such as the
Nonaligned Movement and the European Union (1997: 181). These entities, Gupta
argues, are good examples of transnational communities. His argument should be
extended to include those strongest of transnational feelings which are informally
structured around ethnicity. Such informal ethnic structures predicate nationalist
movements like pan-Arabism.
Pan-Arabism suggests a unification of Arabs as a people who share multiple
ethnic and cultural similarities. Today it is the idea that sustains ethnic patriotism not
to just a particular state, or a unified Arab nation as in Nasser's time, but to Arabism
writ large. It is the driving force behind Arab unity, and implies that Arabs share a
common ethnicity, whether or not that is actually the case. For instance, Djiboutians
and Comorese are all considered Arabs under the umbrella of pan-Arabism, despite the
fact that they are not included in most representations of "the Arab Middle East." Of
course, citizenship in a particular state does not automatically make one Arab, and so a
widely-held belief in certain parts of the Middle East (namely the Arabian Gulf states)
assumes importance in determining Arab ethnicity. It holds that "true Arabs" can trace
their genealogy to one of several tribes originating in the Arabian peninsula, the "true
Arabia," even though large portions of the modern Arab world are unequivocally non
tribal. Thus, the defining feature of pan-Arabism today seems to be the common
14

language of Arabic, not membership in a particular state or adherence to particular
religion or even genealogy. States themselves are not rendered irrelevant in this
development of Arab identity, as many of the Arab states were formed in conjunction
with the development of a pan-Arab identity, especially in the case of Jordan as
discussed below.
The identity marker "Arab," then-while a vital voice in Jordanian or Iraqi or
Djiboutian identity-is an intrinsically transnational national identity, referring to a
greater Arab nation that is not regionally specific but has members across the globe.
Yet pan-Arabism does not sequester specific national identities within Arab states or
on the transnational level, as in Arab Detroit. Indeed, Abraham and Shryock argue
that individual national identities are important for actors to become part of American
culture: "Learning to speak about and for themselves is how Arab Detroiters, as
individuals, enter the American mainstream" (Abraham and Shryock 2000: 28). Thus,
self-identity as "Jordanian American" appears to be crucial in order for people of
Jordanian nationality or descent to enter mainstream America. The state identity of
"Jordan" is important; however, the context in which such an identity is invoked is of
more importance than the actual sentiment connected with the state, in examining the
processes involved in the making of national identity.
How people talk about themselves (self-identity) is of supreme interest to
anthropologists because such talk necessarily involves social agency and the
negotiation of multiple cultural influences. In other words, national identity cannot be
assumed to be naturally occurring or endowed at birth. Rather, it is actively made by
15

individuals in given contexts. Brian Schiff has coined the expression, "identity-talk" to
refer to the "articulation of a sense of collected selfhood in words" (2003: 279). In his
work with Arab students at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, Schiff argues that
identity-talk among the Arab students was and is strongly influenced by social
relationships, as it is these relationships that manage the cultural meanings that one
may "attribute to the self and articulate in narrative" (2003: 280). This highlights the
importance of examining diasporic communities such as Jordanians in Michigan in the
context of concentrated transnational ethnic communities, in this case communities of
Arabs in America (Abraham, Abraham and Aswad 1983) and Arab American
communities, and in the context of an even greater multicultural community (Detroit,
Michigan, the United States), by shedding light on the consequences of the social
relationships that are formed within these environments.
When I began to look at Jordanian American national identity in Michigan, I
was told by one prominent scholar on Arab Americans, Frank, that my efforts would
be futile ... that there are not "enough" Jordanians in Michigan, or more importantly,
that they are not well-established, that Jordanian Americans do not exhibit cultural
structures and systems that are readily identifiable as they are among, for instance,
Lebanese American communities in southeast Michigan. What Frank was telling me
was that Jordanian clubs, businesses and social-political and economic networks do
not exist as they do for Lebanese and Palestinian communities, and because Jordanian
'

Americans do not exhibit recognizable or publicly cohesive social structures, making
such a distinction was at best futile. This quick dismissal on Frank's part fueled my
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interest in Jordanian American identity and also provided me with a side objective,
which was to prove him wrong.
Ahmed in America
Ahmed came to the United States twenty-five years ago from Jordan as a
student. I know some of Ahmed's family back in Dhamraq, Jordan-the rural village
from which he came; I was able to meet him in Michigan through our mutual
acquaintances in Jordan. Ahmed hails from one of three prominent families that have
traditionally settled in Dhamraq. After earning his degree in engineering from the
University of Detroit, Ahmed went back to Jordan briefly to marry his wife. He
moved her back to the US, and in the process gained American citizenship. He now
has five children-all boys-ranging in ages from one to twelve. Ahmed has lived in
Michigan longer than he lived in Jordan.
Now living in Dearborn, an immediate suburb of Detroit which is also home to
the largest concentration of people of Arab descent in North America, Ahmed recently
sold his gas station business in a northern suburb to pursue real estate. Having been in
the US for twenty-five years, he is well-connected in the Arab American and Jordanian
American communities. Indeed, he can be considered a community leader among
Jordanian Americans in Dearborn (there are other concentrations of Jordanians living
around Livonia and Lathrup Village-also cities in suburban Detroit).
Ahmed has returned to Jordan for visits twice since he had children. He hasn't
gone more often-he laments-because of the high price of airline tickets and trip
expenses (hotel, food, etc.), which for a family of seven can total more than $30,000.
17

On those trips back to the "homeland," as he calls it, Ahmed has enjoyed staying with
his family, and marveled but at the same time mourned the development that has taken
place since he lived there.
"I remember Jordan as I left it 1979. There was no electricity in [Dhamraq].
Once, the last time I was there, the electricity went out for ten minutes. My family
was scrambling to find the gas lamps and candles to brighten the room-I was in no
rush for light. It was the still, calm blackness that I remembered about living there.
That brief lapse in power triggered so many memories of the old country," Ahmed
recounted for me. His memory of Jordan is fixed in a particular time in history, before
phones and electricity had reached Dhamraq. Moreover, his remembrances of people
are also fixed in a particular time. For instance, he could not believe that I was friends
with the sons of his former schoolteacher, who today, after becoming a school
principal, is on the brink of retirement. "He was my teacher when I was younger! Just
starting out!" Ahmed recalled.
Memories of the homeland are indicative of how transmigrants fix part of their
national identity in the historical past from which they came. Ahmed is not naive of
the fact that Jordan has changed, and is changing, since he left. Indeed, he keeps
abreast on the news through two Arab satellite signals, the Internet and news from
relatives in Dhamraq. Yet Jordan for Ahmed is what he left behind in 1979, and it is
what he thinks of when he thinks of himself as a Jordanian in Michigan. Below, I
'

examine Brian Schi:ff's use of the term "cultural currents" to examine in greater depth

18

how Jordanian Americans incorporate notions of the homeland, Jordan, into their
transnational identities.
National Identity and Cultural Influences
According to Brian Schiff, the Arab students at the Hebrew University in
Jerusalem are concurrently influenced by social relationships and what Schiff terms
"metaphorical streams or currents of thoughts" that are derived from cultural and
social groups comprised of both Palestinian and Israeli "values, symbols, cultural
practices, political philosophies, styles of social interaction, habits and fashions"
(Schiff 2003: 279), in addition to other influential currents such as pan-Arabism,
nationalism, "modernism" and Islamism. I make a similar case for Jordanians in
Michigan by arguing that the formation of Jordanian American national identity is
influenced through negotiations of three such currents: An American current, a
Jordanian current, and an Arab current, which I will describe in detail in later
chapters. 1
As I argued above, cultural sentiment vis-a-vis Jordan comprises a large part of
"Jordanian American" as a national identity. However, individual actors selectively
negotiate and modify the Jordanian cultural practices, values, habits et cetera that they
express in Michigan. Similarly, they also selectively negotiate American political
philosophies, fashions, and social interactions in concert with the Jordanian current.
Finally, Joraanian Americans also negotiate national identity through pan-Arabism writ
large in addition to Michigan's Arab communities, which was discussed above.
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These decisions and negotiations by social actors must not be understood as
arbitrary, as if selecting foodstuffs from a smorgasbord; rather, I reemphasize Stuart
Hall's point that identities are historically and institutionally situated (1996). Thus,
national identities must be thought of as malleable to the extent that they are a
outgrowth of, a sentiment toward, and a set of feelings about the time and place in
which one is living. Sentiment is generally depreciated in national identity studies
because it initially seems superficial and capricious, but I argue that it is central to an
understanding of the ways in which people make sense out of who and what they are.
The fourth edition of Webster's New World College Dictionary (2001) defines
sentiment as "a complex combination of feelings and opinions as a basis for action or
judgment; general emotionalized attitude." Webster's definition suggests that
sentiment is not frivolous or arbitrary and that it is the predicate for action. Sentiment,
then, is essential to the making of national identity; the context in which sentiments
themselves are influenced directly modifies the way in which national identity is
conceived by social actors.
It seems convenient to neglect the fact that most studies about identity are
written from the top down. That is, even the most scholarly notions about identity in
general tend to be nested in Westem archetypes and ethnic ideals, imposed and
inscribed from above. Jordan, for instance, was created by the British as a buffer state
with-fairly arbitrary-borders between Palestine and Iraq, and Syria and the Arabian
Peninsula, after World War I. It had been characterized by British explorers as
"unruly" and "ungovernable" until the arrival of and establishment of power by King
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Abdullah in the early 1920s (Salibi 1993). Jordanian as a national identity, then, was
conceived in conjunction with this newly created emirate in the desert. Pan-Arabism

was the driving force behind identity-making in the Levant, as originally King Abdullah
(himself an alien to the Transjordanian territory, a Meccan hailing from the Hijaz)-in
concert with pan-Arab idealism-sought to make the new country of Jordan the home
of every Arab. Consider the following statement by King Abdullah, quoted in Salibi
(1993: 93):
I do not wish to see any among you identify themselves by geographical
region. I wish to see everyone, rather, trace his descent to the Arabian
peninsula, from which we all originate. All the Arab countries are the country
of every Arab.
It is within this pan-Arab environment, then, that the beginnings of Jordanian identity
may be better understood. That is, King Abdullah' s rhetorical vision of Jordan was, at
its inception, a country less concerned about its geographical identity and more
concerned about its ethnic makeup.
Initially, the British were the ones occupied with national identity in Jordan.
The development of the world system of inter-state relations and the rise of states in
the Arab Middle East contributed to the evolution of a Jordanian nationalism based on
the inclusion of some and the exclusion of others. This inevitably leads to the
question: If all Arabs were truly one under the ideals of pan-Arabism, even according
to Jordan's first king, how did Arab states come to be exclusionary and those living
within their boundaries develop national identities with political-geographic
21

significance? Most probably due to the colonial effects of not only the British but the
Ottomans and those before them, that served to divide Semitic land and parcel it out
based on naturalized notions of place in colonialist narratives that were continuously
propagated by monarchs that colonialists installed.
This leads me to a discussion of the importance of Jordanian history, vis-a-vis
tribalism, in the making of national identity on both the national and transnational
levels, and how such histories may be understood as relevant and significant in the
processes whereby social actors make and maintain national identity.
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CHAPTER III
"IN JORDAN WE HAVE MANY TRIBES"
In Jordan, representations of what I call "Jordanianess" have typically been
couched in terms of tribal culture, particularly of traditional Bedouin lifesways. Linda
Layne (1994) discusses this extensively in her book about national identities in Jordan
and sees it as a major contributing factor to Jordanian nationalism. While many or
most self-identified Jordanians woufd posit themselves as members of a tribe, they
might only appeal to this membership publicly at politically advantageous times. In
close social relationships, fictive kinship may be based on membership in a tribe. This
is frequently the case with urban Jordanians, though invoking tribal affiliations for
advantageous purposes is also characteristic of the younger population in more rural
villages. According to 0ystein LaBianca (1994: 207), tribalism in Jordan is
characterized by "strong in-group loyalty among members based on variously fluid
notions of common descent."
Tribal affiliations are most frequently invoked to authenticate one's
Jordanianess in the face of a contested identity. The contesting identity in Jordan is
almost always perceived to be "Palestinian." According to Karen Fog Olwig
• (1999:
370):
The authority a group may gain from establishing a particular heritage for itself
derives not just from the group's demonstration of a common origin and
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historical continuances, but more importantly from its successful exclusion of
others from this heritage and the privileges associated with it ...
This echoes Stuart Hall's (1996) earlier point that identities are the marking of
difference and exclusion. While all other national identities are excluded by definition
from identifying with Jordanian nationality, it is Palestinians as a whole that must
absolutely be excluded because they present, as seems to be perceived by "authentic
Jordanians," the gravest threat to Jordanian viability within the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan. Perhaps this is become some estimates say that Arabs of Palestinian descent
outnumber Jordanians within the kingdom at a ratio of two-to-one. Many Jordanians
believe that Palestinians desire to overthrow the Monarch and assume Jordan for
themselves. Whatever the reason, a clear multinational tension is present in Jordan
that is exacerbated by the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and by the fact that King
Abdullah II is married to a woman of Palestinian descent.
On one occasion during my 2001 fieldwork in the Jordanian village of
Dhamraq, I happened to bring along a copy of Andrew Shyrock's book entitled,
Nationalism and the Genealogical Imagination: Oral History and Textual Authority
in Tribal Jordan (1997) in my briefcase.2 The book's cover shows two Arab men
wearing traditional white dishdashas signing documents. There are also several
photographs of Arab tribes in the text itself One of my primary informants and closest
friends, Majid, a Jordanian, noticed the cover and asked to look at it. He was unaware
until seeing Shyrock's book that any such literature existed about Jordanians, and he
was even more impressed when he recognized a photo of Sheikh Sultan al-Adwan
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(Shryock 1997, 231), a very famous Jordanian tribal leader, in the text. Fluent in
English, he skimmed the book quickly and we had the following exchange:
MAJID: Ahh, this is a book about Jordan? Very good. Where did you get this
book?
DAYID: It is a book about the tribes in Jordan. it's available in the United
States.
MAJID: Really? [He thumbs through the pages, stopping at the pictures and
examining them.] It this what you want to do? To write a book about the
history of our tribes in Jordan.
DAYID: Not exactly, but sort of I would like to know more about the history
of the tribes in Dhamraq, of the Adwan, of the Bani Sakr. But I am interested
in learning about Jordanians and Jordanian history.
MAJID: Very good, this is very good. I can help you learn about Jordan's
tribes. In Jordan we have many tribes. I am ... [And he proceeded to list his
tribe along with a number of tribes in Jordan and their approximate locality
within Jordanian territory.]
In his fascination with Shryock's book, Majid was equally pleased to teach me
about true Jordanianess vis-a-vis the tribes of Jordan. If I was to find out what
comprised Jordanianess, I need not look further than tribal histories. Equating
Jordanianess with tribal lineage is certainly not a new idea, and one that has been
'

discussed at length elsewhere (Layne 1994; Shyrock 1997; Abu-Odeh 1999), though it
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certainly presents a strong case for unilineal descent and thus kinship (or fictive
kinship) as necessary for inclusion into an "authentic" Jordanian identity.
Jordan: A Brief Background
Jordan as a political-geographical nation was created under and as a result of
colonialism. Adnan Abu-Odeh's excellent book, Jordanians, Palestinians, and the
Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process (1999) is highly recommended
as a study in the nationalist history of Jordan and Palestine. In order to give a very
brief background to my own work, I borrow extensively from Abu-Odeh's account of
the birth of Jordan (1999: 7):
Right after the end of World War I, the victorious Allies, now the heirs of the
Ottoman Empire, introduced two systems into the eastern Mediterranean
region. The first was the nation-state system, and the second was a new
international regime that gave some of the wartime allies a 'mandate' to
administer the former Ottoman colonies until they became full-fledged nation
states ... The new Arab entity that was to become Jordan was carved out of a
Palestine that had been enlarged to eastward and beyond the River Jordan by
the British government and the Zionist leaders with the goal of building a
national home for the Jews... With the new map, the old parochial loyalties
to a tribe or a region, to a village, a town, or a district-were made even more
complicated by a new loyalty to the centralized political authority the map now
defined as a nascent nation-state ... New regional map-defined identities began
to materialize.
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Jordan and Palestine were administered under the same mandate, and as such were
treated as complementary entities by the British. The two entities shared the same
currency and security command, in addition to intense commercial interaction. "The
social organization of Transjordan during this time was largely tribal, with marriage,
discipline, local defense, and the individual's sense of sodal identity determined by
tribal affiliation" (Abu-Odeh 1999: 13). Jordan eventually became an independent
nation-state, as a Kingdom (based on the Hashemite authority since the installation of
Abdullah I, part of the Hashemite dynasty of Mecca that traces its genealogy to the
Prophet Muhammad, the founder of Islam), in 1946.
The point of this background is to establish that Jordanian nationalist narratives
were created within and because of those geographic boundaries established by the
British after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. They did not pirouette intrinsically from
Bedouin tribes, but rather in response to dictated boundaries. "Transjordan had never
been identified as a distinct entity before Britain and France became the dominant
imperialistic powers in the area" (Abu-Odeh 2000: 13). However, mythmaking in
Jordan has been successful. Norma Khouri, in her very recent book about honor
killings in Jordan, speaks of"customs, morals, and values Jordanian society [has]
upheld for thousands of years" (2003: 26). This is actually an impossibility, for
"Jordanian society," as it were, has only existed since formation of Jordan less than
one hundred years ago: There was literally nothing nationalistic there before Jordan's
'

creation.
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Jordanians, Palestinians and the Predicaments of Classification
It is somewhat futile to establish succinct definitions of "Jordanian" and
"Palestinian," not because such distinctions are lacking among individuals, but because
the definitions of each vary according to virtually every individual who would self
identify with either group, and also because national identities in Jordan and Palestine
are not confined to just these groups. Adnan Abu-Odeh's 1999 book, mentioned
earlier, dealt in part with Jordanian national identity. In the book, Abu-Odeh (1999:
xv) employed the following classifying terms:

Transjordanians: Jordanian·nationals of Transjordanian origin.
Palestinians: The Arab people ofMandatory Palestine.
Palestinian-Jordanians: Palestinians who became Jordanian nationals after
the unity of the West and East Banks in 1950.

Jordanians: Jordanian nationals irrespective of their origin.
Clearly, these categorizations fall short of accounting for all segments of Jordan's
society. For example, in Jordan there is a young but sizable generation that was born
in Kuwait, of Palestinian families, and who now hold Jordanian citizenship (passports)
after Operation Desert Storm forced them to leave the Gulf What, then, are their
national identities or national classifications, since they self-identify as Palestinians but
are hardly a/Mandatory Palestine and would certainly not think of themselves as
Jordanians i? the sense that Jordanians think of themselves. A better question might
be, What processes have led to the construction of these identities? Indeed, I know
many self-identified Palestinians who have never even been to the West Bank. This
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reinforces an aspect of identity addressed earlier, which is that "nationality" (or
citizenship of a state) does not equal "culture."
Highlighting the voices and complexities of national identities in Jordan runs
the risk of distorting the predominant sentiments of society in Jordan, which distinctly
fall along one of two lines: Jordanian or Palestinian. This division permeates all
sectors of community and political life (including the Royal Family-King Abdullah II
married a Palestinian woman), and while it is important to note that within these two
groups exist many sub-layers, the two divisions are clearly the most important for
purposes of social mobility in Jordan.
"Real" Jordanians, as I have mentioned above, can ostensibly trace their
heritage through tribal roots that are specific to contemporary Jordanian territory and
ultimately to the Arabian peninsula. "Real" in this context is still an invention in light
of the formation of Jordan as a kingdom; however, "real" is defined here in opposition
to those that might otherwise lay claims to Jordanian identity, the Palestinians.
Citizens in the Kingdom who are not Palestinians are eligible to be "real" Jordanians.
Or, as Jordanians themselves say, "We are Jordanian Jordanians," as opposed to the
widely invoked "Palestinian-Jordanian" as Abu-Odeh noted above.
"Palestinians," according to many of these so-called "real Jordanians," should
not be able to achieve the same military or diplomatic ranks as Jordanians, nor should
Palestinians be afforded the same public benefits that might be accorded to a Jordanian
(an educational scholarship from the King, for instance). These real Jordanians would
likely invoke "Jordanian" as both a national identity and as an ethnocultural marker.
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On the other hand, some Palestinians living in Jordan believe that while their
homeland may be Palestine, Jordan is their home (for now). They have established a
livelihood and family in Jordan and have established social networks there moreso than
Palestine. Many Palestinians believe that they helped build Amman (the Jordanian
capital) into a thriving metropolis of innovation, science and technology with the
emigration of several hundred thousand educated Palestinians to Jordan from Kuwait
and other Arabian Gulf states during and after the 1991 Operation Desert Storm.
Their history is made amongst and with other Palestinians in Jordan and Jordanians.
Therefore, their national identity is more fluid-at times it may be Palestinian, at other
times it may be Jordanian, but their ethnic identity is staunchly Palestinian.
Palestinians and the National Past
Palestinians have formed the majority of the population in Jordan since 1949.
Rashid Khalidi, a leading authority on Palestinian identity, calls the process of Israel's
state formation, 1947-49, "lost years" for Palestinian identity, as " ... it was difficult for
outsiders to pick up on the strands of a single narrative, and to identify where the
focus of Palestinian identity was, or whether in fact it had survived the debacles of
1947-49" (Khalidi 1997: 179). · Edward Said thinks it almost impossible to imagine a
single narrative of Palestinian history because of the diversity of Palestinian
experiences in emigrant and refugee communities after the Israeli state's creation. It is
to this void of a masterwork of Palestinian history that he attributes the discontinuity
in Palestinian identity (Rushdie 1991).
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But, there is no masterwork of Jordanian history either. .. at least in the manner
there is for Egyptian, Syrian or Tunisian history, for example. There is no great leader
of the national past save for a handful of venerable tribal sheikhs who stood up to
Ottoman and/or British authorities, though the veracity of these stories is somewhat
lacking (Abu-Odeh 1999). There is no George Washington or Christopher Columbus.
The difference between the Palestinian and Jordanian variances in history is that the
Jordanians began their mythmaking at roughly the same time the Palestinians were
encountering the formation oflsrael and the dissolution of their territory. Whereas the
Palestinians had to become freedom fighters in a national struggle, colonialism in
Jordan was largely acquiescent, peaceful and relatively brief
The Jordanians had a tangible territory to which they could attribute and invent
stories and folklore; the population was comprised of people who were there
indigenously. Jordan also had a monarchy with direct descent from 'Ali, the Prophet's
cousin, which called themselves the Hashernite dynasty. Both of these factors
contriouted to the nation-building and creation of a national past, so that by the
beginning of the twenty-first century, Jordan had a veritable history and territory from
which a distinct national identity has emerged. Palestinians, who did have a distinct
national identity before Israel's formation, experienced an exodus of people to other
parts of the Arab world and beyond, creating an early but coerced transnational
community that exists to this day. This exodus, if we follow K.halidi's and Said's
arguments, contributed to the breakup of a national narrative upon which Palestinians
could build their national identity.
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Yet if we truly consider the implications of their arguments, then the same
arguments could be made for every national identity in the world. The difference, of
course, is that Palestinians do not have internationally recognized statehood and
therefore are not seen as coeval members of the world political system. However, the
absence of international legal recognition of statehood does not erase the national
narrative of a given nation; after all, why is there a distinct Palestinian national
identity? The way in which the national narrative of Palestine, and of all nations, has
been and is being formed has changed. Narratives that people can identify with are not
always being created in geographically specific locations; rather, they are being created
as and within communities and other cultures across the globe. The multitudinous
experiences of Palestinians or Jordanians in refugee and expatriate communities all
contribute to what it means to be a Palestinian or Jordanian.
I am not arguing the fact that territory and land is important; it most definitely
1s. However, the land upon which Palestinians have attached a nation is only partially
theirs through international regulations. The same is true, to a greater or lesser extent,
for other nations that do not have political states, such as Chechnya, Western Sahara,
Kurdistan, and so on. This does not mean that land is unimportant to national
narratives, but rather that the act of achieving statehood (by whatever means) is part
of the narrative for some nations.
If Jordanians immigrate to Detroit, Michigan or anywhere, does the act of
immigration make them less a part of the Jordanian nation than if they were still living
in Jordan? Or does it simply change/transform their position within the nation? Do
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Jordanians that immigrate to Michigan (and their subsequent generations)
automatically become part of the American nation, or can only those actually born in
America be considered part of the American national narrative? The answers to these
questions are not fixed and indeed have controversial, politically-charged
consequences depending on who is answering them in what context and for what
purposes. Yet these are the very questions that need to be asked and thought about in
light of transnational processes.
The lives of transmigrants intersect political boundaries and bring multiple
societies into a single social field (Glick Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton 1992). The
bounded notion of a tribe, then, should not be understood to constrict the
socioeconomic mobility of its members; one does not lose tribal affiliation, affinity or
membership by virtue of transnational migration. There are certainly social and
economic implications of such movement, but none of them serve to disjoin tribal
identity. Rather, tribalism is but one concept that maintains transnational attachments
between places, societies, families and people. Tribalism contributes both to the
national identity of Jordanians in Jordan, as I have argued, and to Jordanians in
Michigan and in communities around the world.
Tribalism as Jordanianess in Michigan
Thinking again about what Frank, the scholar on Arab Americans, told me as I
embarked on my research with Jordanian Americans in Michigan, I decided to pose the
question in its raw form to Ahmed and one of his good Jordanian friends, Yousef,
from Madaba, who has only been living in Dearborn with his family for four years.
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DAVID: Ahmed, tell me, what is it that makes Jordanians distinct as a group, a
national identity, in Michigan? The Lebanese have their stores and social and
economic networks, the Palestinians and Iraqis have their social clubs. What
make Jordanians unique?
AHMED: [thinking sternly for a moment] I would have to say it is our tribal
identities that make us unique. No matter our family affiliations and our
associations with towns and villages in Jordan, you will not find the kind of
tribes in the Middle East that you find in Jordan. Yousef, you agree?
YOUSEF: Ahmed is right. ·We are very much ...
AHMED: I don't mean to say that tribalism hasn't changed over the years. It
used to be much stronger than it is now. But it still means something. Our
children don't know about it, they aren't trained in it. But they will know
when they study history. I am also an American, but I don't lose my
'Jordanian.'
DAVID: So do you mean that your children here in Michigan-for them, the
tribe will not be as important as it was for you? How will they learn about
your tribe?
AHMED: No, no. It will be important. I will teach them. They will know
when they return to Jordan to visit. When I took my son there [on our second
visit] I told him he could go and play and run around the roads as far as we
'

could see and he didn't have to ask my permission to go anywhere. Here in
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Dearborn I am always checking on them [the children]: On the street, in the
backyard, because things happen here. In Jordan, I let them run.
For Ahmed, tribalism is not only a deeply embedded part of his Jordanian identity, it is
the structure that in part defines social life in Jordan. In his example, tribalism was
equated with what he perceived to be the security and safety of his family. In
Dearborn, while Ahmed feels that tribalism is the essential voice in the making of
distinct Jordanian national identity, it assumes meanings that locate it in a specific time
and place in Jordan. Thus, tribalism as exhibited in Jordan and tribalism as expressed
in Michigan are different and have different consequences.
Tribalism in Michigan is more an appeal to the past, to the once was and to the
specific in location and time. In Jordan, tribalism is an institution that governs in many
respects the social processes one experiences in daily life, in addition to being an
appeal to the "real" as discussed above. In Michigan, the kinship and fictive kinship
networks that maintain tribal structures and allegiances are often far away in the
homeland (it is rare to find multiple members of the same Jordanian tribe in Michigan)
and thus, tribalism is not so much a lived experience as a remembered one. Of course
this is a generalization and is subject to the situations of individual actors, though for
Jordanian transrnigrants such as Ahmed, tribal affiliation-while very much real and
important-is not a daily reality or concern unless he is being asked to ass�rt his
identity as a response to a question or contention. In this manner, tribalism is very
much important as an invocation of the "real" in a wider community of Arab
Americans, in which Jordanian Americans may struggle (as a demographic minority) to
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maintain their public national identities among free associations with Palestinians made
by others in Greater Detroit.
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CHAPTERIV
THE NEW SEPTEMBER11 NARRATIVE AND ANTI-ARAB JINGOISM
It is important to situate any discussion of Arab American identity in an
understanding of the sociopolitical climate toward Arabs in the United States post
September 11, 2001. My first ethnographic fieldwork with Arab Americans in
suburban Detroit took place in November 2002, a solid year after the September 11
terrorist attacks. At the time, inklings of the United States government's intentions in
the Middle East, specifically in relation to Iraq, were beginning to coagulate. Already,
policies wrought of the Patriot Act-enacted "to deter and punish terrorist acts in the
United States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools,
and for other purposes" (United States Government 2001: 1)-had become manifest
in the very communities of suburban Detroit in which I hoped to work and where I
indeed conducted my first interviews.
An already ethnically and politically-taught environment was heightened during
this time period, when the White House promised to make good on its threats of
deposing Saddam Hussein's regime from power in Iraq. Finally, on March 20, 2003,
the United States launched what was to be the first of many air strikes on.Iraq. The
attacks and ensuing battles ended with the taking of Baghdad and the occupation of
the country by US military forces which continues at the time of this writing. The
implications of the war in Iraq for Iraqi Americans and Iraqis in America were
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tremendous as the Federal Bureau of Investigation moved to question thousands of
Iraqis. According to the Associated Press, 6, 700 Iraqis had been questioned by the
end of March. It is unclear if the FBI stopped the questioning as military operations
drew to an end by mid-April. 3
These observations raise broad concerns for Arab Americans, and hold
meaningful implications for the making of Jordanian American identity. Those
concerns entail what seems to be an ongoing, tolerated anti-Arab racism in America
coupled with an en vogue, widespread jingoistic discourse, creating a sociopolitical
American climate that is inhospitable to both established, and new entrees into, Arab
American communities.
The context in which Arab Americans are engaged in identity-making has been
altered in light of active September 11 discourse in the United States and around the
world. While the perpetrators of September 11 were allegedly all non-immigrant
Arabs, the United States government was quick to correlate these specific acts of
terrorism with a new order of "terrorpolitik" having conception in the Arab Muslim
Middle East. Previously unknown to the general public, terror organizations (most
notably al-Qaeda and its association with Osama bin Laden, a Saudi Arabian national)
were characterized as global networks of terror capable of perpetrating mass
destruction by way of infiltration into mainstream society. Thus, September 11
discourse, while initially stemming from widespread emotional identification with the
loss of nearly three thousand lives on American soil, has been transformed by many
including prevalent segments of American policymaking like the White House-into a
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vengeful jingoism searching for a scapegoat. It was through this process that the
White House was able to convince much of the American public that Saddam Hussein
and the Ba'ath regime in Iraq was connected to the September 11 attacks, despite a
complete absence of credible evidence.
The new September 11 discourse goes something like this: The threat of an
attack on the American homeland is no longer imminent; it has arrived. If such a
catastrophe could occur within a context of ostensible mundanity (would September
11, 2001 be historically remarkable under different conditions?), the probability of it
happening again is certain. Thus, national security vis-a-vis Arab/Muslim terrorism is
once again thrust to the forefront of government (and civil) concerns, only this time it
is expressed in terms and feelings unknown to a large American demographic.
As quickly as America laid the blame for September 11 on Osama bin Laden
and his conspirators in terror (which could be anywhere), the White House and scores
of prominent officials, scholars and celebrities appeared in popular media to
disassociate the bin Ladens of the world (along with other so-called fundamentalists)
with the "real" Islam (despite the ambiguity of what, exactly, "real Islam" is, and
ignorant of the resurgence of conservatism throughout the Arab world). President
George W. Bush on more than one occasion urged the American public not to take
out understandable frustrations with terrorists on their fellow countrymen of Arab
descent. He took meetings with Arab American leaders and reiterated that America's
new war on terrorism was not based on religiosity or ethnicity, but rather on making
"the world" (read: America) secure. Michigan's governor at the time, John Engler,
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met with Arab American and Muslim leaders in late September 2001 at state offices in
Detroit. "Any actions that unfairly target the Arab-American community are wrong,"
4
Engler said after the meetings. Yet there were many instances of violence and racism

directed at Arab Americans and Arab interests in Michigan and throughout the United
States.
A group of victims' families and survivors of the attacks launched a
multibillion-dollar lawsuit against Saudi Arabia. People who even looked "Middle
Eastern" were asked and sometimes forced to disembark commercial airline flights.
On September 12, a California man ·sent ethnically intimidating e-mails to employees of
the Arab American Community Center for Economic and Social Services (ACCESS)
in Dearborn. 5 Six thousand men of Arab descent were targeted for deportation, out of
314,000 people of all ethnic backgrounds who were allegedly in the United States
illegally. 6
One particularly troubling episode involving a Yemeni man and his Michigan
boss was recounted in the September 22, 2001 edition of the Detroit Free Press.
Ahmed Esa, a resident ofDearborn's South End-a concentrated Arab population
area (Abraham, Abraham and Aswad 1983)-was harassed by his boss and dismissed
from his workplace of fifteen years. The boss, Paul, told the Free Press reporter:
When these guys ran their plane in there like that and hurt all those people, that
was the end of it right there. That made their religion-you might as well
write it as I say it-the scum of the earth ... I'm definitely a nonbeliever, so I'd
be his enemy. I've read the Koran. It says all non-Muslims are enemies.7
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Paul's attitude toward Esa is representative of many uninformed Americans who base
their understandings of Arabs and Muslims on ethnic archetypes continuously
propagated by so-called experts on cable news programs, and on syndicated radio and
in newspaper columns. This anti-Arab attitude continues to pervade American
sentiments about September 11, drawing undeniable associations between sheer
demoniac men and an entire ethnicity (Arab) and religion (Islam). And yet these
American attitudes are not new.
Anti-Arab Racism in America
Parallels between pre-September 11 instances of anti-Arab racism in the United
States and the current anti-Arab racism in America can be drawn, thereby illustrating
the way in which historical anti-Arab racism is contemporarily realized through a new
narrative in Arab American communities. In addition to its inherently harmful effects,
I argue that such racism intersects (and intercepts) both ethnographic methodology
and the identity-making processes among Arab Americans in Michigan. It becomes, as
I will illustrate later, part of the American cultural current in which they're making
identity.
Nabeel Abraham (1992, 1994) has extensively examined anti-Arab racism and
violence in the United States, especially during times of American military intervention
in the Middle East. His general argument is based on the premise that anti-Arab
racism is really the last shade of tolerable racism in the United States writ large, and
therefore attacks on people who even "look Arab" occur with greater proportional
frequency than they do with other minority ethnic groups, especially when Arabs and
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Arab Americans are reified in the media during times of military conflict in the Middle
East (Abraham 1994). He found the 1980s to be a decade in which Arab Americans
"lived in an increasing state of apprehension as the Reagan administration wages its
'international war on terrorism'" (Abraham 1994: 161). A decade after Abraham's
essay, it seems the international war on terrorism has intensified and become even
more intrusive into the lives of Arab Americans, and that their attitudes have moved
from concerned apprehension to legitimate fear.
Abraham's 1992 work, "The Gulf Crisis and Anti-Arab Racism in America" is
proof positive that the current state of American-Arab relations are evocative of the
past. The manifestation of tension among Arab Americans after September 11 serves
to demonstrate that United States attitudes toward people of Arab descent has not
changed much over the decades. Abraham notes that particular instances ofjingoism
and blind-patriotism during Operation Desert Storm included backlashes against
celebrities that protested against the war and physical and verbal attacks aimed at
anyone "who fit the American stereotype of' Arab "' (Abraham 1992: 257). Post
September 11 attacks included many against Indian Sikhs because of the traditional
turbans and facial hair that make Sikh men so identifiable, in addition to the types of
incidents described above. And recent statements by politicians or celebrities who did
not agree with the White House position on the war in Iraq were met with great
hostility and, in the case of the popular music group the Dixie Chicks, an all-out
boycott by overly patriotic Americans.
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The issue here is not to discover what informs such bigotry (the reader can
make their own assumptions). Rather, I propose that we begin thinking about the
ways in which the making of Arab American identity is affected by such anti-Arab
American attitudes. Most of the anti-Arab racism and violence falls under the
categorization ofjingoistic racism, according to Abraham� which is a "curious blend of
knee-jerk patriotism and homegrown white racism toward non-European, non
Christian dark skinned peoples ... spawned by political ignorance, false patriotism, and
hyper ethnocentrism" (1994: 193).
This racism, combined with what Abraham calls "nativistic xenophobia," is
what largely informs the new September 11 narrative currently being play�d out in and
by the United States and many of its citizens. The xenophobia is based on "perceived
differences of race, culture, ethnicity and religion... [whose] source is rooted in racist
nativistic attitudes ... deeply embedded in U.S. culture" (Abraham 1994: 188-189).
When nativistic xenophobia-which appears to be ideologically motivated and
infrequent-is combined with jingoistic racism-which seems to be reactive and
episodic in relation to U.S. involvement in the Middle East-the American
environment in which Arab national identities are fomented becomes acrimonious at
best. Moreover, if Abraham's idea of nativistic xenophobia is taken to its extreme
conclusion, America has historically not been and is not likely to become a permissible
environment for Arab American identity to take shape. Arab Americans are left to
negotiate this hostile environment within the new September 11 narrative, influenced
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by an antagonistic American current in the formation of a Jordanian American national
identity.
It is especially troublesome that anti-Arab racism thrives in America's
postmodernist society that has supposedly undergone heavy and important lessons of
multiculturalism, through entertainment, elementary and secondary schooling, cultural
festivals, international scholar and student exchange programs and so on. Yet the
effects of cultural diversity programs, whatever their incarnation and benefits, have not
necessarily been altruistic. As I argued in chapter one, daily mulitculturalism is often
the perpetual cause of frustration and anxiety in a nation, as different cultures or ethnic
groups lay claims to what comprises national identities. Americans are not influenced
by the same cultural currents that influence Jordanians in the making of national
identities in Michigan, nor do Americans necessarily feel that Jordanians are entitled to
access cultural currents that might resemble their own. Racism and violence in this
context serve as goaltenders to the American way of life, the American Dream,
whatever that is perceived to be.
"Go Back To Where You Came From!"
I was invited to Ahmed's home one evening. He introduced me to his children,
naming each one, and when he reached his middle son, he said "This is Osama."
Osama's brothers who were standing next to him began to laugh at him teasingly. I
smiled to ease the tension as Osama smirked and looked up at his dad, who patted him
on the head. Ahmed said, "Yes, he's our little terrorist. After September 11, he came
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home from school crying. The kids were teasing him, they called him a terrorist. He
was very upset."
"But Osama is a very common name in the Middle East, isn't it?" I asked.
"Yes, it is. Osama was an early figure in Islam. So this is what I told the
teacher. But you know, they don't know. And now at home I tease him about it, call
him a terrorist with a laugh, so he became less sensitive to it. It doesn't upset him as
much, it is kind ofa joke now. It makes it easier for him."
While it is generally recognized that children can be delightfully cruel to one
another, it is another thing altogether when such anti-Arab racism is expressed among
adults. Ahmed sees a difference in the degree ofracism present between urban centers
such as Dearborn, and more rural or outlying villages and cities in Michigan.
Dearborn, as previously mentioned, is the city with the highest concentration ofArab
peoples in North America, so anti-Arab racism-while still present-is not as intense
or as likely to be expressed there as it might be in cities or villages with less or no Arab
American residents.
Ahmed, who recently sold his gas station which was located in an outlying
area, said people used to say to him, "Why don't you just go back to where you came
from!?" Ahmed, a pensive man, would retort: "Where did you come from? Why
don't you go back there?" He compares his experience ofliving in Dearb?,rn and
doing business in a more rural city.·
Ahmed truly sees America as a nation ofimmigrants, and that he just happens
to be a newer arrival than the Caucasian majority. "It's ridiculous, this 'back to where
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you came from.' I've been here twenty-five years... I'm an American too! These
guys that say these things to me, they've been here for longer, they're families came
over on the boat, I came over on a plane. Other than the Native Americans, we all
came from 'over there," Ahmed said.
"But do you take it to heart? How does it affect you?" I asked.
"Yes, it does hurt, but it doesn't affect who I am. It may change the way I do
things, it may change ifl speak out. I always have the Jordanian in me, it is who I am,
you cannot deny history. I am proud ofit, people should be proud ofwhere they came
from."
"How have things been recently, after September 11, with the war in Iraq?" I
was curious to know.
"Oh it's really bad. You see we don't know, it's rough. We don't know what
is the government doing. We know they are watching us, we know it is difficult to get
through airports because ofthe way we look. We didn't do anything. [President]
Bush was here in Dearborn twice, but it is a small amount that support him."
"Really? On TV they showed rallies ofArab Americans dancing in the streets
here in Dearborn after Baghdad fell recently," I said.
"That was small group, very small ... for the TV. Most ofus don't go out.
Most ofus are against it. Look what's happening now! We keep quiet," s�d Ahmed.
Anti-Arab racism and the threat ofgovernment surveillance does produce an
anxious and hostile American environment for Arab Americans. As I have argued, the
racism and tension have only multiplied since September 11; they have historical
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antecedents. Such acts of racism may be subtle, not apparent to the outside observer,
and thus are hard to gauge or quantify. But the fact that they are real to someone like
Ahmed implies that they must also produce very real consequences, whatever form
those consequences may take (physical emotional, psychological, legal, etc.).
Whether it was the taunting faced by Ahmed's son, Osama, in school, or the
people who yelled at him to "go back where you came from" in his gas station, anti
Arab racism does exist, and it does influence the American cultural current which is
negotiated by Jordanian Americans in the identity-making process. Ahmed clearly
considers himself an American, but in the context of a nation of immigrant Americans.
The racism that he faces, intensified by the new September 11 narrative, has
undeniably become part of the American cultural current and national label that Ahmed
also invokes to identify himself
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CHAPTER V
ON THE AIR IN ARAB DETROIT POST-SEPTEMBER 11
Southeast Michigan is home to the largest concentration of Arab immigrants
and Arab Americans (Americans of Arab descent) in North America, more than
200,000 strong (Abraham and Shryock 2000), though southern California actually has
a higher number of people of Arab descent. Jordanians comprise only a fraction of this
number, though they are present and exist as a distinct cultural group. Kim
Schopmeyer, in an analysis of the demographics of metro Detroit's Arab American
communities, lumps Jordanians and Palestinians into a mono-category defined as
"Palestinians from the East and West Banks" (2000: 69). Using the 1990 US Census,
Schopmeyer found "Palestinian-Jordanians" claim 7.6% (4,761 members) of the total
self-reporting population of 62,699 Arab Americans in Michigan. Of that, Jordanians
comprise 3.3%, or just over 2,000 individuals (Schopmeyer 2000: 71). However, in
the text of the demographic analysis, Schopmeyer always refers to Palestinians and
Jordanians as a unified group, while careful to separate other closely associated Arab
groups such as the Lebanese and the Syrians. Such demographic glossing
authoritatively denies the viability of both Jordanians and Palestinians as unique
national iden_tities in Michigan and within Arabism writ large. This stems, I argue,
from a greater unawareness of the intricacies of cultural and national identity in Jordan
and Palestine, which I will discuss later.
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Jordanians began moving to Michigan in the middle to late part of the
twentieth century, though they were not the first Arabs to settle in Michigan. People
of Arab descent-mostly Syrians, Lebanese and Yemenis-arrived to work at Henry
Ford's automobile plants in Greater Detroit. Jordanians may have initially moved to
other cities-such as Dallas, in Ahmed's case--before moving to the Dearborn area.
Dearborn and Greater Detroit became preferable for many Jordanian transmigrants, for
there they could benefit from rapidly developing pan-Arab culture and political
economy that was and has been developing in southeast Michigan since the dawn of
the Motor City industry.
Many Jordanians came to the United States to study at American universities,
and then ended up applying for citizenship and staying. Some that I was interviewed
studied at the University of Detroit, Wayne State University, and one of the branches
of the University of Michigan, all of which are located in southeast Michigan.
Jordanian Americans themselves have not traditionally worked in Detroit's auto
industry as laborers, though some have worked for Ford Motor Company as engineers
and resource managers. There are Jordanian American communities in many major
cities such as Los Angeles and New York, though the largest one is in Chicago.
In the case of Michigan's Arab communities, I take up Katherine Pratt Ewing's
call to focus on legal and political consciousness which " ...offers a source of more
nuanced models for how immigrants negotiate identity" (Ewing 2002: 97). If we are
to believe Ewing, authorities such as politics, religion and personal relationships
operate similarly to create understandings and imaginings that locate the self They
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compel people to act and react in certain ways by intersecting the individual's lives in
multiple arenas (school, work, entertainment, etc). The authorities are given varying
degrees of value by the individual in the identity-making process at particular times in
history. Thus, "national identities are malleable constructions generally open to
dispute in reaction to shifting political and historical circumstances" (Ulin 2001: 208).
Post-September 11 Life in Arab Detroit
In the wake of September 11 and procedures wrought of the Patriot Act of
2001, undulations of Ewing's legal and political consciousness have literal
consequences for Arab American societies in Michigan. That is, the general anti-Arab
atmosphere in the United States today has changed the way in which Arab Americans
talk and think about themselves and others as individuals. Institutionally, realities are
changing for Arab social welfare agencies in southeast Michigan. More and more
resources are consumed informing the Arab American and Chaldean communities of
changing regulations and expectations of them by federal agencies as varied as the
Departments of State and Treasury to the FBI, INS and Border Patrol. Federal
funding for these agencies is waning just as immigration procedures-something on
which most agencies spend a majority of their time and resources-are becoming more
difficult. Even the slightest error on an immigration and naturalization form (or any
federal document for that matter) is cause for total dismissal of a case, or a grant, for
instance. So-scrupulous attention is give to each specific case.
A decrease in funding for these agencies translates as a decline in employees
and the amount of people that can be served. Some agencies will close a few of their
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branch offices and lay off employees, thereby overburdening the agencies' directors. 8
As such, community outreach programs in culture, medicine and language--while a
vital part of the missions of these agencies-have sunk to lower priority so staff can
keep up with ever-changing government policies that have become central to their
patrons' needs.
Here, September 11 provides a prime example of how "American political
culture insists that Arabs have integrity as a group" (Abraham and Shyrock 2000: 29)
by positing Arabs in a general category that can be manipulated by outsiders and
mobilized from within. It also allows us to reconsider Arab Detroit as a transnational
community in which the rules of inclusion are dichotomously unclear but present. It is
an imagined community in two realms: By those that would consider themselves part
of Arab Detroit (what Thomas Eriksen describes as the view from within, as discussed
in chapter one) and by those who look at it from the outside. In other words, what are
the structures of feelings that have maintained "Arab Detroit" as a discrete entity that
can be talked about? Political policies post-September 11 suggest that the American
government, at least, does not know how to deal with Arabs at any other level than as
a monolithic whole (consider the Homeland Security measures to register non-citizen
Arab males from predominantly Arab and Muslim states), despite the nuances of
national identity present in the Arab American communities of southeast M,ichigan.
The sense of power through which national identities are fomented by individuals
within this context, are self-experiences with "affective, historical and bodily
relationships to such identities" (Ewing 2002: 95).
51

The Interview
In November 2002, I was invited to participate in a call-in Arabic radio talk
show, of which there are several in the greater Detroit area. These programs are very
popular among the Arabic-speaking communities and estimated listeners number in the
tens of thousands every week for the particular program of which I was a part. Of the
two-hour airtime of the show, I was allotted the second hour to explain my
ethnographic presence to the Arab American community. Both the host, Robert and
myself thought that this would benefit my research as it would show the community
that I was both a) a serious academic researcher, and more importantly, b) did not
work for the FBI or the federal government in any way. 9
In the hour preceding my spot, as ethnographic luck would have it, agents
from the US Border Patrol were the guests. Under new laws, Border Patrol agents
can search cars and personal property within a certain distance of the (in this case)
Canadian border. The host asked the agents to explain the procedures a person might
expect if they were to be stopped or searched by a Border Patrol agent. This
interview solicited a high volume of call-ins from listeners, who questioned everything
from the legality of the searches to discriminating procedures to how one could get a
job working for the border patrol. Finally, the first hour was over and it was time for
me to take a position at the microphone.
I was_ uncomfortable with the association of being on the radio show the same
day as these government officials, for our very presence on the same broadcast
arguably connected-in the listeners' minds-my research with the government's
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meddlesome surveillance of Arabs in the United States so widely reported in local
media (see Stoller 1997). For my interview, the host invited the leaders of the
Jordanian American community leader to chat along with us... to "keep the
conversation going," he told me, and ultimately, I believe, to lend legitimacy to my
intentions. The interview went smoothly. I began by explaining anthropology and
fieldwork, and then talked about my rationale for studying Jordanian and Palestinian
communities in Michigan. Robert and the hosts reiterated to the audience that they
thought it was great that someone was finally attempting to study cultural groups
particularly Jordanians and Palestini.ans-as individual entities, outside the monolithic
whole of"Arab Detroit," as they are so commonly lumped. This challenges the notion
of a singular imagined community, clearly showing that these Jordanian Americans at
least consider themselves to be a very viable and distinct community unto themselves.
Despite the enthusiasm present in the interview, we elicited just one caller, an
older gentleman who--in a very small but determined voice-wanted to make
absolutely sure that I recorded in my "book" the wonderful hospitality and warmness I
received from the Jordanians in Jordan, and to note that it was Jordanians specifically
that were so kind to me, as an American. Hospitality and friendliness, noted the caller,
were Jordanian hallmarks. 10
After the interview, I asked the host why we elicited almost no response to the
community. He said that, quite frankly, times have changed. The Arabs in Michigan
have endured extreme scrutiny by both government authorities and the general public
as represented through mass media, directly as a result of the events of September 11.
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Interest in Arab Detroit as a whole has increased in nearly all realms. That I, as a
researcher, came to the community with the intention oflearning about individual
cultural and national identities, particularly ofJordanians, perhaps-Robert
suggested-may have elicited a reactionary warning against my intentions (despite
their purity), to those who might otherwise have participated. Despite my credentials,
the question became: Why would anyone be interested in the interstices ofArab
Detroit now for any purpose but to nefariously infiltrate? This legal and political
consciousness on the part ofJordanians in Michigan has relocated their public identity
away from "Jordanian" and moved it toward the greater mass of"Arab American." A
large, cohesive group is-in theory-harder to infiltrate. Their national identities in
private, as is evident through my ethnographic interviews with Ahmed, for instance,
suggest that such identities are very much expressed in more private domains.
Yet whatever the protection this ethnic aggregation provides concurrently and
increasingly disallows individuals to speak for themselves as Jordanian Americans-it
is not that they don't speak in terms ofbeing a Jordanian American, is that the
sociopolitical environment in which such expressions may be made is more hostile to
them. I argue that this has changed the discourse about Jordanian American national
identity in Michigan, to maintain integrity as Arab Americans which, ifwe follow
Abraham and Shryock, disallows them to enter mainstream America. It is also
illustrative ofhow the new September 11 narrative has affected the local Arab
American communities' interaction with outsiders.
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Arab American News is a weekly paper that is published in southeast Michigan
and has a global presence on the Internet (www.arabamericannews.com). Some
permanent articles on the Internet site, when accessed in late March 2003, included
"Tips for being Arab in America" and "Anti-Muslim incidents on the rise." A
particularly telling and interesting (albeit sarcastically disquieting) commentary piece
on the site is by Muhannad F. Haimour and titled, "Survival Guide for Arabs and
Muslims." It reads, in part:
Many of us have the American flag in front of our homes and businesses.
That's not enough. Consider having the American flag be the curtains and
blinds in your home. Visit the nearest department store for some really neat
ideas that will surely get your patriotic message across. Don't put any yard
signs in front of your home that are not in full support of everything our
President says... Consider some new and creative yard signs and bumper
stickers such as 'I love my President UNCONDITIONALLY' or 'I will gladly
and enthusiastically give up all my civil liberties, if it makes you feel better.' 11
This type of editorial material is offered in sharp contrast to media images of
celebrating Arab Americans in the streets of Dearborn after the U.S. military
occupation of Iraq, for instance. It is a confirmation of the inherent jingoism of
American society in which Arab Americans find themselves making and m,aintaining
their national identity in Michigan.
The historical circumstances that inform the cultural currents which influence
Jordanian Americans must be accounted for in any ethnographic interpretation of the
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national identity-making process. In chapter five I examine how we might begin
ethnographically engaging histories which themselves are dynamically interacted with
by the social actor. In the course of this discussion I will question whether national
identity can truly be seen, as James Clifford (1988: 34) has proposed, as a "nexus of
relations and transactions actively engaging a subject."
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CHAPTER VI
ETHNOGRAPHICALLY ENGAGING DYNAMICALLY ENGAGED HISTORIES
Prevailing definitions of national identity suggest that one of the most
important aspects in the process of identity-making is that its members share a
collective heritage and base their understandings of identity on a collective national
history. "History, then, is very much a mythical construction, in the sense that it is a
representation of the past linked to the establishment of an identity in the present"
(Friedman 1992a: 195). In the case of Palestinians, Edward Said argues that the
heritage and history of Palestine is so varied, so inconstant and conditional, that any
core upon which Palestinians could build a firm national identity (namely a state) must
contain multiple histories (Rushdie 1991). Indeed, multiple histories lead, literally and
figuratively, to multiple identities. Jordan's leaders, the Hashemite Kings, worked
very hard at the creation and promotion of Jordanian identity during the Kingdom's
fledgling years. Still, Jordanian identity has been defined in relation to Palestinians
since Jordan's inception, as is evidenced with the various engagements and
disengagements Jordan has had with the Palestinians over the decades, including the
confederation of the East and West Banks for a period.
This leads me to a discussion of Liisa Malkki' s (1997: 71) proposition that
"identity is always mobile and processual, partly self-construction, partly
categorization by others, partly a condition, a status, a label, a weapon, a fund of
57

memories." She follows Dick Hebdige (1987: 10) in arguing that while identity cannot
be traced back to a "pure point of origin," history should not be ignored as a dominant
factor in its making. I argue that history is vital to any active realization of national
identity, keeping in mind that it is primarily the individual "fund or memories" that
forms the basis of such identities.
Ted Swedenburg notes that much of the recent scholarship on history as a
cultural construction "tends to conceive of memory as a collective project that is
crucial to the consolidation or construction of group, community, or national
identities" (1995: xxix). These works, he argues-such as those of Benedict
Anderson (1983)-tend to neglect memory's transnational dimension; that is, the
global dimensions of economy and culture that influence identity-making.
Transnational communities, such as Arab Detroit, develop as cultural and economic
brokers in relation to national identity. For instance, Ahmed tried to establish a store
selling Jordanian imports such as kitchenware and foodstuffs in the early 1990s. He
did not succeed in his business and was forced to dissolve it because the Lebanese
American communities have a monopoly on retail stores, restaurants and other
businesses catering to the public in southeast Michigan. Ahmed's only customers were
primarily Jordanian Americans, of which there are admittedly few in Dearborn, as the
Lebanese Americans continued to patronize shops owned by other Lebanyse
immigrants. Because the Lebanese are so highly concentrated in Dearborn, and they
do own most of the businesses, minority Arab groups-such as the Jordanians-also
end up shopping and doing business at Lebanese American establishments. So while
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pan-Arabism may be part of the memory drawn upon in the making of Jordanian
American national identity, it does not reappropriate Jordanian currents that would
leave a vacuum to be filled by pan-Arabism: In Ahmed's instance, it was a matter of a
small Jordanian American population and the organized power of the Lebanese
American communities to edge him out, that forced the closure of his store. Indeed,
for the Lebanese Americans, their Lebanese current(s) influenced them to shop at the
Lebanese stores.
In light of Swedenburg's point, we may begin thinking about individuals'
"funds of memories" in a broader context, realizing that history-in any setting-is not
a nebulous conception. I argue that these global contexts, which influence the way in
which social actors withdraw from the "funds" (vis-a-vis revision and interpretation),
are what contributes to both their and our understandings of the past in relation to
their definitions of self
Engaging history in nationalist narratives is a way of creating identity to the
degree that it yields a relation between that which " ... supposedly occurred in the past
and the present state of affairs" (Friedman 1992b: 83 7). History is an abstract
nomenclature when referred to generally, so engaging distinctive aspects of and
periods in history (i.e. tribal affiliation) is especially important in creating unique
identities. Recorded and/or remembered history incites individuals to liv�r at the
very least talk about-their lives in definite ways that differentiate them from other
individuals. More aptly stated, history leads people to do and say the things they do.
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An informant's testimonies do lend credence to the past, even if their memory
of the past seems skewered by the social elements of an oppressor, or if the strife of
yearning toward a perceived normality has affected the way an informant relays the
past to the ethnographer. Indeed, "identity politics have to be analyzed in terms of
current regimes of power that aim to regulate ... and discipline people" (Blanc
Szanton, Basch & Glick Shiller 1995: 686). The goal of anthropology, though, is not
be the "referee" in a game of truth, as Michael Herzfeld puts it (2001: 57)-to
determine authenticity and/or make judgments about rights and wrongs-but rather to
distinguish how local actors perform in light of and because of their own memory
(and forgetfulness) and their own histories. Social life is always processual, thus
observable change cannot be based in a notion of static social systems. Such
institutions do not exist. This "impermanence of the permanent" (Herzfeld 2001) is at
the juncture of anthropology and history. Power and control, especially on the
hegemonic level and in the incarnation of state-sponsored nationalism, follow as
necessary contributors to identity making and maintenance in the sense that they
intersect with the individual's experience of self through the "taken-for-granted
background of everyday life" (Ewing 2002: 94).
Allan Hanson (1989) discusses this in some detail in his work on colonialism
and the Maori of New Zealand. He says that politically dominant "inventors" of
culture treat their invented cultures and traditions as if they were the actual state of
affairs and, in a way, force it onto those under subjugation. This cultural imperialism,
Hanson argues, is necessarily a product of colonialism and "tends to maintain the
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asymmetrical relationship ofpower (Hanson 1989: 890). The point ofjust who does
the inventing is further explored by Robert Ulin (1995: 1996) who looks to historical
and political economic factors as influencing both who does the inventing and the
invention process itself, but warns not to neglect the agency ofthose who may not be
in power roles as still contributing to the invention. Even the seemingly non-powerful
hold some power in the making and maintenance ofidentity and aspects thereof, yet
those negotiating relationships ofauthority and power are also "negotiating the
resources to privileged discourses and, in so doing, the means for composing
alternative identities" (Schiff 2003: 281).
Colonialism has played an utterly important and effective role in the making of
Jordanian identity by initially determining whose representation ofthe past was
authentic so that a nationalist past could be invented and naturalized by the Jordanian
state. This allows us to recall the earlier point about history as a mythical
construction, especially for Norma Khouri (see chapter two), who imagines a long
history as representative ofa certain past that, through cultural continuity, links it to
what she perceives to be the current unbalanced relationship ofpower between males
and females in Jordan.
Citizens in/ofthe State
The notion ofJordanian identity as a national identity attenuates this argument
into several'more specific questions: 1) Who is defining it?; 2) Who is ascribing it?;
and 3) Who is subscribing to it?. These questions, raised in the context ofMichigan's
Arab community, assume meanings from both the homeland, Jordan, from the United
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States, and from the Arab American community. For example, given that Jordan is a
monarchy, replete with royal hierarchy, it might be easy to say that the Royal Family
has considerably shaped nationalist ideologies into a precisely rendered national and
cultural identity. But this is only part of the story, as the Royal Family has been
engaged in the making and maint�nance of its own Hashemite cultural and religious
identity with roots in the Hijaz. What, then, is the interplay between Jordanian
national identity and this identity-making among the ultimate elite? In Michigan,
where the Jordanian state is less involved in people's lives, how have structures of
feeling within the Arab American community contributed to the essence of what it
means to be a Jordanian and, moreover, a Jordanian American?
What Edward Said claims necessary for the establishment of a complete
Palestinian identity, that is the authority of confederated, multiple histories, initially
seems to be true for conceptualizing identity in any nationalistic or transnationalistic
realm. These histories, however, need not be "master narratives" in the sense that he
and Rashid Khalidi propose.. Rather, the narratives themselves are created by those
who are living through them. People's experiences and engagements with and of
history is necessary for an understanding ofjust what is involved in the making and
maintenance of national identity. Precisely how people engage history is at the core of
the dynamic processes involved in identity formation and reformulation. �ocial forces,
be they political, economic, religious, or otherwise, influence the manner in which
history is dynamically engaged at any given time. Olwig (1999: 370) has noted the
importance of this in anthropological studies of the past, saying such studies
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...should include the processes whereby certain conceptualizations of the past
become dominant over others in particular historical periods in response to
specific social and economic realizations and the implications of these
conceptualizations of the past for the creation of identity and community in the
present.
While the processes and constitution of identity may always be mobile and
processual, identity itself is not. That is, while the characteristics of Jordanian identity
are constantly shifting, people are also moving along with those changes. While
Jordanian can thought of as "Arab," as I discussed in chapter one, "Arab" is also
subject to the same elasticity as any national identity-there are more actors involved
in pan-Arabism. For our purposes, "Jordanian" is "Jordanian," regardless of what
comprises it at any given time in history. I am not saying that national identity is a
tautological concept, but rather that people adhere to a national identity because it
somehow defines who they are. When someone invokes the identity "Jordanian," they
may be drawing upon particular aspects of what they believe "Jordanian" comprises
such as pan-Arabism-whereas another person who would invoke the same national
identity is referring to different aspects. Even as scholars continue to theorize nations
as permeable and unbounded, have we really begun thinking about national identities
as unbounded concepts and markers of those unbounded nations? Have �e taken into
consideration the effects that concepts and entities such as tribes serve to bound
cultures and national identities to the extent that they serve as a meaningful bridge
between multiple cultural currents?
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We should begin thinking about people's identity in terms ofbeing citizens in a
state rather than citizens of a state. 12 The legal status of"citizen" has little to do with
the personal sense ofself: It tells a person what they are, not who they are (Donald
1996). National identity-making, then, in some sense is an intensely personal
endeavor. Transnational processes suggest those involved in the making ofnational
identity in transnational spaces are assuming new layers ofidentity while not
necessarily shedding their other identities (assuming they were their to begin with).
Identities are not necessarily transformed, as such, but added to. Whatever
"Jordanian" means in Jordan also has meaning in Michigan. But by virtue ofliving in
Michigan's Arab American community, new identities are added to "Jordanian."
Thus, as Nabeel Abraham and Andrew Shryock have rightly asserted, "Arab American
is a new identity that must be learned" (2000: 29). We may infer, then, that all
transnational identities (such as "Jordanian American") cannot be assumed and must
be learned. Though I must acknowledge that sociopolitical circumstances as they are
provide many more tangible consequences for Arab Americans, and Jordanian
Americans, than they would for say, Italian Americans or Dutch Americans.
At the risk ofobjectifying Jordanian national identity into a lifeless thing, I
think it is important to reemphasize that it is a collective group ofhuman beings and
the sum oftheir sensibilities and cultural currents that comprise any natior:_ ial identity.
National identity is not an imagining, feeling or sentiment conceived frivolously.
Following Linda Layne (1994) and James Clifford (1988), I agree that national identity
can adequately be viewed as "a series ofcultural and political transactions, not all-or64

nothing conversions or resistances... a series of ad hoc engagements ... episodes, turns
in the ongoing engagement" (Clifford 1988: 342).
Making Identity and History
Clifford has argued that distinctive identity-making processes can and should
be thought of as deeply embedded in the diversity of local histories. When Clifford
says that these engagements are ad hoc, he means they are adaptable and malleable,
which leaves them generally open to dispute. If the identities are open to dispute, so
are given interpretations ofhistory. "Interpreting the direction or meaning of[history]
always depends on present possibilities. When the future is open, so is the meaning of
the past" (Clifford 1988: 343). Openness, in this respect, implies a sense of possibility
and a reason for hope, and forces one to examine the diversity of the local histories
involved in the making of Jordanian American national identity in Michigan
Nowhere does the future more seem more open than in the United States,
especially for immigrants who often arrive with great hope. Young Americans
themselves are taught from an early age, "Be all that you can be," "Believe in
yourselfl," "You can do it!." The United States has at the epicenter of its foreign
policy discourse the promotion of freedom and democracy, building upon an American
society of supposed openness and freedom of expression in whatever form that may
take. Whether or not American society is "open" is debatable; however, hope and
possibility are apparently infinite in American cultural narratives, especially those
centering on creativity and cultural expression: "The possibilities are endless." In the
American context, the burden seems to rely heavily on the individual in the making of
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their individual national identity. Yet, as I have argued previously, the nation must be
somehow fixed within cultural currents that are shared and understood by other
individuals in order for those individuals to talk about themselves in similar ways.
In Jordan, narratives stressing individuality have been largely nonexistent.
Societies in Arab Middle East are comprised around social units that stress collective
identities, whether they involve tribalism, the family or the state, built on honor and
obligation. When one accomplishes something involving self-achievement-such as
obtaining a university degree, for instance, or earning high salaries in professions
abroad-it is rationalized by both the individual and the community as bettering the
social environment of the collectivity of"we." Thus, identity-making processes in
Jordan involve not only the invention of tradition, as it were, but also an adherence to
collective understandings of the self.
Identity-making processes in any context are imbued with meaning through
interactions with particular cultural currents and acted upon with purpose; they are
also situated within narratives characteristic of the time and place in which they are
played out. While the making of national identity does not occur with mere
happenstance, it may be viewed as a cultural response to hegemonic influences of the
present interpretation of the past. Clifford is correct in explicating identity as a series
of cultural and political transactions that are dynamically moving but not .._!otal
committals to any extreme. They are dynamic in the sense that they are adaptable to
the changing situations of the present; however, they are fixed in engagements with
history.
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This approach holds an expectation for change (Layne 1994), and allows us to
look at the making of national identity as a dynamic enterprise in which all members
are involved at various ( even disadvantageous) levels. Palestinians, then, play a vital
role in the establishment of Jordanian identity not only because they comprise a
majority of the population in Jordan, or because they attempt to claim Jordanian
identity, but because they provide one catalyst through which the Jordanian identity is
constructed. This means that Jordanians might have a definition of Palestinian identity
that differs significantly from an identity Palestinians might claim for themselves, but it
is nonetheless a real entity inasmuch as it is used to in defining Jordanian identity.
The opposite is also true, that Palestinians are actively engaged in establishing
definitions of Jordanians that may also be different from what Jordanians themselves
subscribe to. Of course, Palestinians are engaged in the making of national identity
always in a transnational environment. Ariel Sharon, the current Israeli prime minister,
in the 1980s popularized a right-wing assertion that Jordan indeed is the real, one, true
Palestine, and thus all Palestinians should be moved east of the Jordan River (Khalidi
1997). The fact that Palestinians do not have internationally recognized statehood
intensifies their desire to separate themselves further and further from Jordanian
identity in response to such radical Israeli rhetoric, which-in the last several years
has been revived.
In Michigan, Jordanian Americans are engaged in national identity-making
cognizant of the Jordanian cultural current which includes the Jordanian-Palestinian
dichotomy. Yet also on the transnational level of Michigan, Jordanian Americans are
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also influenced by an ever-changing and recently hostile American current and a pan
Arab current that serves to maintain a group integrity in the face of a contested
minority in the United States.
I have argued that Jordanian identity in Michigan has been remade recently,
appealing more to its Arab currents than to those individual national voices that would
set it apart from the pan-Arab community. This does not imply that "Jordanian
American" identity is missing, but that it has changed. Jordanian American as a
national identity has not been erased, but rather publicly sequestered in certain arenas
such as the media. Recognizing the ·nuances of national identity among Arab
Americans in southeast Michigan allows us to consider Arab Detroit not as the
monolithic whole that it is demanded to be, but rather as a complex ensemble of
multiple identities that-for sociopolitical survival-is constantly reinventing itself
The making of national identity is not a course with fixed beginning and
endings. As I have discussed, it is an ongoing and dynamic process that necessarily
engages history and social relationships in its construction, propagation and
engagement. National identity-making also involves a legal and political consciousness
on the part of the actor, who at various times in history may use such consciousness to
locate themselves culturally, ethnically, and politically, especially-as I have argued
on the transnational level. By way of a brief conclusion, we may again t�� to
Clifford's quote, changing it slightly to say that national identity is best seen as a nexus
of sociopolitical associations that are actively engaged, through a dynamic engagement
of history and consciousness, by the actor.
68

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
"Jordanian American" as a national identity has heretofore never been treated
significantly by any anthropologist. Indeed, the whole notion of national identities as
viable constructs-indeed as constructs at all-in transnational places has not been
adequately examined. I have proposed that we begin thinking about global influences
both in specific places and, moreover, how these influences crosscut and intersect the
lives of transrnigrants in the making of their own national identities.
National identities are not simply mandates by a state, sentiments by an
individual, recollections of history, or assimilation behaviors. These may all be
definitive voices that influence the making of national identities, but none of them
individually constitutes a total composition therein. The making of national identities
is not subject to whimsy or temper, yet it is a process that is somewhat malleable, as I
have argued, and open to dispute in certain contexts and in relation to current events.
While national sentiment and state allegiances may be a part of national identity,
cultural institutions and the construction of cultural institutions also greatly influences
the making of such identities.
Th� making of Jordanian American national identity is especially complicated
because of the intricacies of both Jordanian identity at home in Jordan, and within the
transnational communities of"Arab Detroit" in Michigan. Just as we can no longer
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think of "Arab Detroit" as a monolithic whole in light of the variability and
multitudinous differences (even ifjust in sentiment) within concentrated Arab
population centers in southeast Michigan, such as Dearborn, we should also not think
of the Middle East and even specific countries and nations like Jordan in terms of a
singular narrative.
This is not to say that institutions that bind regions or peoples together-such
as a state or pan-Arabism, for instance-are unimportant. But rather that these
authorities ought to be placed in context within the greater realm of social agency by
individuals and groups of individuals. Thinking about national identity in this way
allows us to realize that it is not naturally occurring or spontaneously invented, but
that it is socially, indeed culturally, constructed by individuals.
The implications for this kind of thinking are important, especially, for
understanding the making of Arab American national identities within the American
context of the new September 11 narrative. We realize now that Federal policies such
as the Patriot Act have influences that extend far beyond our already present-day fears
and contemporary inconveniences; they have long-term consequences for Jordanian
Americans in that they serve to stifle and constrict the distinctness of culturally-defined
notions of national identity ... not based on anything they or even another Jordanian
American perpetrated on September 11, but because of their historical
interconnections as Arabs. Pan-Arabism has served as somewhat of a homogenizing
factor in identity-making post-September 11, as opposed to the heterogeneity
implicitly encouraged in the American cultural currents. The tensions between the
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homogeneity and heterogeneity of national identity-making are still being played out in
southeast Michigan's Arab American communities today.
I have argued, too, that Jordanian Americans in general are a minority within
the larger Arab American communities of southeast Michigan; however, Jordanian
Americans still think of themselves as "Jordanians," especially in terms of tribal
affiliations. Perhaps, then, we can postulate that it is affiliation to some tribe-any
tribe-as a whole (not necessarily an individual tribe, such as the 'Adwan) that serves
as one structure of national identity-making (if tribalism equals Jordanianess) among
Jordanians both in Jordan and on the transnational level. Is Jordanian, then, defined
solely by ethnicity? Not necessarily, because there are other social and political
structures that are encompassed in the Jordanian current that influence the making of
national identity. Jordanian tribes themselves have cultural nuances that distinguish
them from other Jordanian tribes and tribes of, for example, Iraq or the United Arab
Emirates.
We have seen that history plays a very important role in the ways that people
define and talk about themselves in relation to the making of their national identity.
While history itself is subject to the selective memory of social actors that dynamically
engage it in nationalist narratives, anthropologists should be concerned with how
actors perform in light of this memory and engagement of history and not concern
themselves with intricate veracities. Social forces, be they political, economic,
religious or otherwise, influence the manner in which history is dynamically engaged at
any given time.
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Citizenship in a state can be but does not have to be related to national identity.
The making of national identity can then be thought of as intensely personal, since the
legal status of "citizen" has little to do with the personal sense of self. Whatever
"Jordanian" means in Jordan also has meaning in Michigan; however, in Michigan,
new identities are added to "Jordanian" (i.e. American, Arab Americans, etc.). Thus,
all transnational identities must be made and learned. One cannot just assume that
national identities are naturally occurring, or that by virtue of moving to Michigan
from Jordan, one will automatically become a "Jordanian American."
As I have also argued, Jordanian Americans are constructing their national
identity within several American narratives, the most recent and consequential of
which is the new September 11 narrative. However, they are also creating their
national identity within a nation-America-that heavily relies on the individual in
cultural narratives, whereas pan-Arab society does not place such emphasis on the
individual. This emphasis on individuality does not detract from the dichotomous fact
that the nation must be somehow fixed within cultural currents that are shared and
understood by other individuals in order for those individuals to talk about themselves
in similar ways. How this is actually done is not of great importance; recognizing that
such processes exist is much more useful because it highlights the dynamic and active
role that individuals-even those at seemingly disadvantageous levels-play in the
making of their own national identities, and these roles are not necessarily laden with
resistance or contradiction.
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The goal of this work has been to offer a more nuanced method for looking at
national identities in transnational spaces. I have looked at Jordanian Americans, and
their past and more recent historical vicissitudes, as examples of how we might begin
to understand transnational national identities and the processes and cultural influences
that are involved in their making. This work is intended to be a stepping stone for
future ethnographic work on national identity, which will hopefully prompt other
scholars to examine more closely the courses and negotiations, in many cultural and
national planes, that go into the creation of distinct national identities.
Research on national identities involving close examination of history and
cultural subtleties of the homeland shows that the making of national identity may
involve practices that re more discursive than overt. National identities may not
always be expressed publicly depending on the conditions of the environment in which
national identity is expressed. This, coupled with the fact that most Jordanians in ·
Michigan are relatively recent arrivals (after all, Jordan itself is a recent creation in
history), also allows us to consider that most Jordanian Americans in Michigan still
have strong ties to the homeland. Many have close family relatives-parents,
siblings-still living in Jordan. This close affiliation with the homeland also adds to
the national sentiment they feel toward Jordan, and thus is more likely to be expressed
in national self-identifications.
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1

The use of the term "current" is implicitly dynamic; it can be understood as a

progression, and active stream.
2

All names of places (save for obvious ones, such as Detroit and Amman) and people

have been changed to protect the identity of those who have generously participated in
my research.
3

"FBI Questions Scores of Iraqis in US" by Deborah Kong, Associated Press, 28

March 2003.
4

"Engler talks with Arab Americans" by Niraj Warikoo. Detroit Free Press, 28

September 2001.
5

"Arab Americans: Man, 46, charges in hate offense" by Cecil Angel. Detroit Free

Press, 18 October 2001.
6

"Black, Arab-American leaders assail racial profiling" by Niraj Warikoo. Detroit

Free Press, 11 January 2002.
7

"Fallout on Arab Americans: 'I'm scared,' metro Muslim says" by Patricia Anstett.

Detroit Free Press, 22 September 2001.
8

Most of this research was conducted at the end of 2002, before the registration

procedures for Middle Eastern males commenced. I imagine Arab American and
Chaldean social welfare agencies have had to mediate and negotiate hundreds of cases
as a result of this latest humiliating procedure.
9

Media reports of federal agents overtly and covertly visiting mosques, churches,

places of business etc. in southeast Michigan were widely circulated post-September
11. The FBI made several public appearances at local Arab social events, and issued
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public appeals to recruit Arab American agents. Such government and Arab American
interaction intensified in early 2003 when the government announced plans to
interview 11,000 Iraqi Americans in relation to "Operation Iraqi Freedom."
10

Indeed, hospitality is a hallmark that Jordanians have truly embodied, specifically in

relation to the tourism industry but also in day-to-day relations. "Ah/an wa sahalan"
(loosely, "You are welcome here") is nearly an official national phrase, and the
symbolism of the Arab coffeepot (with its connotations of being served in someone's
home, a given in Jordan, and treated to lively conversation) is ever-present throughout
Jordanian media and insignia.
11

From www.arabamericannews.com. Accessed on 28 March 2003.

12

John Comaroff, personal communication.
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Date: November 5, 2002
To:

Robert Ulin, Principal Investigator
David Chaudoir, Student Investigator for thesis

From: Mary Lagerwey, Chair
Re:

HSIRB Project Number 02-10-23

This letter will serve as confirmation that your research project entitled "The Making and
Maintenance of Cultural Identity Among Jordanians in Michigan" has been approved
under the exempt category of review by the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board.
The conditions and duration of this approval are specified in the Policies of Western
Michigan University. You may now begin to implement the research as described in the
application.
Please note that you may only conduct this research exactly in the form it was approved.
You must seek specific board approval for any changes in this project. You must also
seek reapproval if the project extends beyond the termination date noted below. In
addition if there are any unanticipated adverse reactions or unanticipated events associated
with the conduct of this research, you should immediately suspend the project and contact
the Chair of the HSIRB for consultation.
The Board wishes you success in the pursuit of your research goals.
Approval Termination:

November 5, 2003
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